IT WAS no secret what the world wanted to hear from Hamid Karzai when Afghanistan’s president was sworn in for a second term on Thursday November 19th: a commitment to get tough on corruption. Visiting Kabul for the inauguration, Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, said Mr Karzai had a “window of opportunity” to show tangible results. American officials say he has just six months to tackle what one calls “Afghanistan’s mafia state”.

In his inauguration speech, he said ministers in his administration must be “competent and just”. But heeding Western concerns about their behaviour does not come naturally to Mr Karzai. He has been in a combative mood since the West’s much-resented demand that he accept that his re-election was marred by massive vote-rigging. In a recent American television interview he batted back questions about corruption in his government with his oft-repeated line that foreign donors must clean their own act up and stop development funds from being wasted. Such wastage, however, is at least lawful, unlike the Afghan government’s practice of selling jobs to officials who then repay themselves through extortion. Nor is it akin to the impunity the well-connected enjoy.

So entrenched is corruption in Afghanistan that some argue it can be fought only by appointing international prosecutors. But Mr Karzai’s government rebuffs such proposals with a prickly defence of Afghan sovereignty. So the idea now is to create elite Afghan law-enforcement agencies, under the guidance of the FBI and Britain’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). The hope is that locking up some big drug dealers and corrupt officials will show that not everyone is immune.

A special counter-narcotics agency, with mentors from SOCA, that arrests, detains and tries drug-traffickers, has been operating for some time. It was responsible for the conviction of a well-connected drug-dealer later pardoned by Mr Karzai. The agency had its first big success this year when an important drug dealer was brought down by a sting operation and the novel use of wiretap evidence.

NATO is also getting involved. An anti-corruption task force will gather evidence on suspects and pass it to a body called the Serious Crimes Task Force, referred to as “the Afghan FBI”. This will be structured along similar lines to the counter-narcotics outfit, with heavily guarded judges who it is hoped will be immune to intimidation.

The attorney-general’s office, too, has received help. Diplomats hope it will soon announce some senior scalps, probably including ministers (though provincial governors seem immune). Despite all the efforts to protect judges, a recent drug case was mysteriously dismissed, only for the suspect to be found guilty in a hasty retrial.

For some Americans, the crucial test of Mr Karzai’s seriousness in tackling corruption is his willingness to sack Ahmed Wali Karzai, his half-brother, who lords it over the south as head of Kandahar’s provincial council. Both he and his brother deny longstanding allegations that Ahmed Wali is involved in the drug trade. And parts of the foreign effort in Afghanistan also rely on Ahmed Wali, including allegedly the CIA (though he denies reports he is on the agency’s payroll). As one NATO official in Kabul put it, Ahmed Wali’s “ruthless use of patronage” has annoyed many people and possibly increased support for the insurgents. But it has also kept many other people on side. “Ahmed Wali is the only thing holding Kandahar together right now,” says the official, speaking of a city second only to Kabul in importance, and suggesting that in tackling this important symbol of perceived corruption it is not just Mr Karzai who has a conflict of interest.